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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPING A SECURITY MECHANISM FOR SOFTWARE
AGENTS
This thesis proposes a message security solution on multi-agent systems. A gen-
eral security analysis based on properties of software agents is presented along with an
overview of security measures applicable to multi-agent systems. A security design and
implementation has been developed to protect communication among agents. And this
implementation scheme has been applied to Seagent, a semantic web enabled multi-agent
framework. Hence, a set of agent security mechanisms have been adapted for Seagent and
have been implemented for message confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation. Then these mechanisms have been tested for communication performance
on Seagent.
iv
O¨ZET
YAZILIM ETMENLERI˙ I˙C¸I˙N BI˙R GU¨VENLI˙K MEKANI˙ZMASI
OLUS¸TURULMASI
Bu tez c¸oklu etmen sistemleri u¨zerinde bir mesaj gu¨venlig˘i c¸o¨zu¨mu¨ o¨nermektedir.
Yazılım etmenlerinin o¨zelliklerini temel alarak olus¸turulan genel bir gu¨venlik analizi, c¸oklu
etmen sistemlerine uygulanabilen gu¨venlik o¨lc¸u¨tlerinin go¨zden gec¸irilmesi ile anlatılmıs¸tır.
Etmenler arasındaki iletis¸imdeki korumayı sag˘lamak ic¸in bir gu¨venlik tasarım ve im-
plementasyonu gelis¸tirilmis¸tir. Bu implementasyon mekanizması bir anlamsal web ta-
banlı c¸oklu etmen c¸atısı olan Seagent u¨zerinde uygulanmıs¸tır. Bu nedenle Seagent ic¸in
birc¸ok etmen gu¨venlik mekanizması uyarlanmıs¸ ve mesaj gizlilig˘i, bu¨tu¨nlu¨g˘u¨, dog˘rulug˘un
kanıtlanması ve reddedilememe mekanizmaları implemente edilmis¸tir. Daha sonra bu
mekanizmalar Seagent u¨zerindeki iletis¸im performansı ic¸in test edilmis¸tir.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a combined study of message security solutions and multi-agent
systems. By the progress of multi-agent systems, usage of these systems for different
organizations have increased. Different organizational multi-agent platforms services in
various domains have different requirements. One of these requirements as message secu-
rity has been a conventional security problem where intruder agents not to read, modify,
insert or delete messages. So, these problems exist in a semantic-web enabled multi-agent
system, Seagent. Introduction and subsequent chapters propose a solution for security
related operations on Seagent.
1.1. Background
Security risks exist throughout the agent life-cycle. These risks are present dur-
ing agent management, registration, execution, agent-to-agent communication, user-agent
interaction, and agent mobility.
In recent years, the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA), an orga-
nization pursuing the promotion of technologies and interoperability specifications that
facilitate the end-to-end interworking of intelligent agent systems in modern commercial
and industrial settings, has become an influencial part of the agent community. The
FIPA 98 Agent Security Management specification ”(FIPA 1998)” outlined the require-
ments for secure intra- and inter-platform communication. FIPA 98 Security Management
addressed mutual agent security issues for agent-to-agent interaction. This specification
does not mandate the use of security features. Instead, it mandates how agents and agent
platforms may interoperate in a secure fashion, if security is desired.
This specification allows security to be implemented at the message transport layer,
through the use of security services available from a shared transport protocol at the agent
platform. At the agent level, this specification relies on an asynchronous messaging model
of communications. All information regarding the protection mechanisms employed to
encapsulate a given message is provided with the message.
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In 2003, FIPA Agent Message Security Object Proposal ”(Vitaglione et al. 2003)”
have been drafted. This proposal introduces the concept of per message security which
means that each individual Agent Communication Language(ACL) message ”(FIPA
2002b)” contains the security information required to process the embedded security
safeguards. Agents are intended to process the security mechanisms themselves where
appropriate so as to provided end-to-end (or peer-to-peer) security. With this approach
specified FIPA Security Object ”(Vitaglione et al. 2003, p.4.)” has been introduced to be
used for encryption and signature scenarios ”(Vitaglione et al. 2003, pp.5-8.)”.
1.2. Problem Statement
With the principles for secure message transfer and expansion of security into the
area of mobile agents, the multi-agent systems(MAS) security design considerations have
been mentioned. Necessary security services are defined in order to provide entities within
a MAS to assure confidence in the distributed system environment and to prevent it from
the security attacks. By thinking about the FIPA compliant architectures, the problem
is specialized as the security of communication between agent platform mediators such as
Agent Management System(AMS), Directory Facilitator(DF) and the other agents in the
platform.
The manner in which one or more security safeguards may be represented, associ-
ated with security threats, advertised, agreed and invoked, has not been exactly standard-
ized within the agent community. These must be agreed in order to achieve end-to-end
security. Agent security has been represented at a number of different layers in the ACL
communication stack ranging from the use of secure transport protocols, new transport
envelope fields, content ontologies, new security ACL fields etc.
According to ”(Vitaglione et al. 2003)” as shown in Section 1.1., the unstandardized
message security problem is tried to be solved. The problems that are not shown in ”(FIPA
1998)” as public key infrastructures(PKI) and implementation methodology are explained
in detail. Security design solutions take advantage of Security Object to be able to identify
the message security features and protect from insecure communication.
The main security requirements come from the specific properties of agents and
agent systems, such as the open and distributed characteristics of agent-based applica-
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tions, the inherent social interactivity of agents, and the fact that agents may act au-
tonomously while at the same time representing some user. However, Seagent security
approach focuses on security mechanisms to implement security requirements according
to agents’ above characteristics. While Seagent security mechanisms are designed and
implemented, it is interested in the following areas as ”(FIPA 2001)”:
1. Security aspects of FIPA-ACL messages, including both abstract messages and their
concrete encodings: The FIPA ACL message payload has to be securely communi-
cated between communicating agents. For example, the message with its specified
encoding has to be encrypted. However, related parameters have to be added to the
message envelope to understand the operations processed on payload.
2. Security-related conversational interactions between agents: When the conversa-
tion started, first agent must send its public key. Then the other agent uses this
information to realize a secure communication.
3. Abstract and concrete issues of integrity and authentication related to agents: When
an agent sends its message, the other agent have to know that the message is correct
and this message comes from the expected sender.
By taking into consideration these information, this thesis is especially interested
in new transport envelope fields and new security ACL fields to be able to solve securing
ACL messages. Because unsecure ACL messages reduce trust between agents and no
standardized implementation is developed for communication security of agents. Hence,
a secure and simple way for messaging is wanted to be designed for Seagent thinking
about the performance challenges for agent message creation and communication.
1.3. Solution Approach
The considered main scenario is the transmission of a FIPA message between two
agent platforms. It is wanted to focus on basic techniques, applied on the transmission
of a single message, that allow several different higher levels to provide secure and trust
functionalities.
The main requirements focused are ”(Greenwood et al. 2003)”:
1. Message confidentiality
3
2. Message integrity
3. Data origin authentication
Such requirements can be satisfied by using many different cryptographic tech-
niques and protocols. The goal here is limited in defining basic mechanisms for including
all the required security information into a the FIPA transport message, so that the
recipients can process (verify, decrypt, etc..) the message properly.
The data formats defined must be independent by the security infrastructure/archi-
tecture adopted (e.g. PKI etc..), must be highly flexible in order to adopt most common
cryptographic algorithms, and must be highly extensible in order to allow plugging of
different formats for the transmitted security information.
Although they should not be mandatory, the existence of concepts like symmetric
encryption (with secret keys), asymmetric encryption (private and public keys) and hash-
ing algorithm to compute message digest are defined as the main security operations of
the system.
In Seagent platform, message sending and receiving is managed by Dispatcher
which is able to wait for incoming messages and send outgoing messages. It uses incoming
message queue for incoming messages and outgoing message queue for outgoing messages.
The incoming messages of Dispatcher come from an internal class after a set of operations
of the agent platform. So incoming message security for Dispatcher is excluded. But the
outgoing queue includes messages that are sent to the agents. However, the transported
message to the agent has to be processed by Dispatcher according to security issues and
these security issues have been reversely processed by agent that takes message.
Implementing above security issues as different security mechanisms and wrapping
these mechanisms in a security service layer has been the main methodology requirement
in Seagent platform. Message-based FIPA-compliant security service layer of Seagent
provides the main security requirements for agent communication. The service layer
provides a solution to add new mechanisms or new algorithms to the mechanisms without
affecting the Seagent platform infrastructure. This approach increases granularity and
makes the complex system structure simpler.
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1.4. Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. This chapter includes the FIPA specified specs
and the improvement of security concepts during its life cycle. Then the problems that
can be compared are told. The mechanisms for these problems are explained in detail.
However, the solution approach thinking about these issues on Seagent is determined.
Chapter 2 describes the agents and their characteristics. The behaviour of agents in
multi-agent systems are identified. Then agent management services are shown. However,
the transport message structure and communication model is identified. At last, Seagent
platform architecture is basically defined.
Chapter 3 describes the main security concepts. In this chapter, the algorithms
are told for providing expected security concerns in Seagent.
Chapter 4 describes firstly the security attacks against agents. Then the system’s
challenges and security requirements for agents are explained by the help of FIPA specified
concepts. Then the attack scenarios are shown by using Seagent agent definitions. The
interaction protocols are defined and Seagent interaction protocol is explained. Lastly,
the previous approaches for agent security implementations are summarized to be able to
have a basic information about the implementation scheme.
Chapter 5 describes the Seagent security. Design and implementation issues of
Seagent security are explained in detail with diagrams. The related experimental results
are measured and addressed for communication, encryption and signature scenarios.
Finally, chapter 6 gives the conclusion of this thesis work.
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CHAPTER 2
AGENT PLATFORM SPECIFICATION AND
SEAGENT
2.1. History and Definition of Agents
An agent is a computational process that implements the autonomous, communi-
cating functionality of an application ”(FIPA 2002a)”. This is the FIPA definition for
agents. But different scientists have different approaches to agent definitions.
In the definition of agents it is often mentioned that they can be described by
mental attributes like knowledge and goals. Sometimes, this is used as the sole criterion:
an agent is an entity whose state is viewed as consisting of mental components such
as beliefs, capabilities, choices, and commitments. So agenthood is in the mind of the
programmer ”(Shoham 1993)”.
Another well-ambitioned approach to define an agent is based on the concept of
an autonomously acting entity: an autonomous agent is a system situated within and a
part of an environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit
of its own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future ”(Franklin and Graesser
1996)”.
One important influence of Agent-Oriented Technology is the rise of Distributed
Artifical Intelligence at the beginning of the 1980s. The Distributed Artifical Intelligence
branch deals with emergent high-level properties of complex distributed systems. Inter-
action and cooperation are important research topics in these intelligent systems ”(Bond
and Gasser 1988)”. Another root of Agent-oriented Technology lies in parallel object-
oriented programming (OOP), combining conventional OO-techniques with distributed
systems.
The main branches of the concept of an agent are:
• The agent as an object with competence: Agents are seen as an extension to
the OOP paradigm. Agents are recognized as complex objects with a higher degree
of autonomy and flexible interactions ”(Shoham 1993)”.
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• The agent as part of a multi-agent system: The interaction between agents are
the focus of this conceptualization. Each agent is a specialized problem-solver, that
communicates and cooperates with other agents to solve a common and complex
problem ”(Genesereth and Ketchpel 1994)”.
• The agent as an autonomous actor: An agent has a view of its environment.
It decides for itself about the goals to pursue and actions to be taken. Interactions
with other agents are possible ”(Franklin and Graesser 1996)”.
• The agent as a mental system: Following this idea, an agent is a logical system
for the description of a mental state including beliefs, capabilities, obligations, etc.
This is problematic in so far, as those attributes sometimes differ considerably from
the common understanding of these terms ”(Shoham 1993)”.
• The agent as personal presentation: The main motivation is to have the agent
acting on behalf of its user without continuous control or interference of the user.
Further, the agent shall adapt to his preferences ”(Gilbert 1996)”.
Agent-oriented techniques promise several advantages over traditional approaches,
especially in the area of complex and highly distributed computing. As being highly
parallel and multi-threaded entities, more efficient computing can be achieved.
Despite their relatively strict closure against its environment, agents are inherently
communication-oriented. The properties that have been tried to be told yield increased
flexibility and dynamics to the resulting overall system.
2.2. Characteristics of Agents and Multi Agent Systems
Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems(MAS) represent a new way of an-
alyzing, designing, and implementing complex software systems. The agent-based view
offers powerful tools and techniques that have the potential to considerably improve the
way in which people conceptualize and implement many types of software. Agents are
being used in an increasingly wide variety of applications ranging from comparatively
small systems such as personalized email filters to large, complex, mission critical systems
such as air-traffic control. At first sight, it may appear that such extremely different
types of system can have little in common. It is the ease with which such a variety of
7
applications can be characterized in terms of agents that leads researchers and developers
to be so excited about the potential of the approach ”(Jennings et al. 1998)”. During
these researches, researchers have investigated different characteristic issues. These could
be identified as follows ”(Borselius 2002)”:
• Situatedness means that the agent receives sensory input from its environment
and that it can perform actions which change the environment in some way.
• Autonomy means that agents are able to act without the direct intervention of
humans (or other agents), and that it has control over its own actions and internal
state.
• Flexibility can be defined to include the following properties:
– responsive: agents ability to perceive their environment and respond in a
timely fashion to changes that occur in it;
– pro-active: agents are able to exhibit opportunistic, goal-driven behaviour
and take the initiative where appropriate;
– social: agents should be able to interact, when appropriate, with other agents
and humans in order to complete their own problem solving and to help others
with their activities.
• Mobility means that the ability for an agent to move across networks and between
different hosts to fulfil its goals.
• Rationality means that the assumption that an agent will not act in a manner that
prevents it from achieving its goals and will always attempt to fulfil those goals.
• Veracity means that an agent will not knowingly communicate false information.
• Benevolence means that an agent cannot have conflicting goals that either force it
to transmit false information or to effect actions that cause its goals to be unfulfilled
or impeded.
Each agent hides its functionality or task from the environment by only defining
his relevance from its role. The autonomy refers to the agents ability in the sense, that
it is not directly dependent on other agents or human users for providing its service or
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fulfilling its task. It may, and normally does make use of the service provisioning of other
agents for his own working.
A multi-agent system is a system composed of multiple autonomous agents with
the following characteristics ”(Borselius 2002)”:
• Each agent cannot solve a problem unaided.
• There is no global system control.
• Data is decentralised.
• Computation is asynchronous.
Computer platforms provide agents with environments in which they can execute.
A platform typically also provides additional services, such as communication facilities,
to the agents it is hosting. In order for agents to be able to form a useful open multi-
agent system where they can communicate and cooperate, certain functionality needs to
be provided to the agents. This includes functionality to find other agents or to find
particular services. This additional functionality can either be implemented as services
offered by other agents or as services more integrated into the MAS infrastructure itself.
Open multi-agent systems are usually envisioned as systems, communicating over
the Internet, allowing anybody to connect to a platform on which agents are running.
This means that the MAS lacks a global system control and that information in general
is highly decentralised.
2.3. Agent Management Services
The FIPA defines three agent management services needed for an agent platform
(AP) ”(FIPA 2004)”:
Directory Facilitator (DF): The DF is an information agent sharing information
about registered services.
Agent Communication Channel (ACC): It is the standard communication
channel between agents on an AP and between APs.
Agent Management System (AMS): The AMS is the actively managing entity
on an AP. It controls the life cycle of agents and resource usage, including the ACC.
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FIPA realized the need for platform integration and in the standard version of
agent management specification, the extra functionality of extending the search to other
platforms is added to the directory facilitator (DF) of the FIPA agent platform. DF, which
provides yellow pages directory service to other agents in the platform, is a mandatory
component of a FIPA compliant multi-agent platform. According to FIPA, multi-agent
platform integration is achieved by DFs registering with each other.
2.4. FIPA Agent Communication Model
Figure 2.1 shows the FIPA message transport reference model
Figure 2.1. Message Transport Reference Model (Source: FIPA 2002e)
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The reference model for agent message transport comprises three levels:
1. The Message Transport Protocol (MTP) is used to carry out the physical transfer
of messages between two ACCs.
2. The Message Transport Service (MTS) is a service provided by the AP to which an
agent is attached. The MTS supports the transportation of FIPA ACL messages
between agents on any given AP and between agents on different APs.
3. The ACL represents the payload of the messages carried by both the MTS and
MTP.
FIPA recognizes three options for an agent when sending a message to another
agent residing on a remote platform illustrated in Figure 2.2:
1. Agent A sends the message to its local ACC using a proprietary or standard inter-
face. The ACC then takes care of the transmission of the message to the correct
remote ACC. The remote ACC will then eventually deliver the message.
2. Agent A sends the message directly to the ACC on the remote agent platform on
which B resides. This remote ACC then delivers the message to B.
3. Agent A sends the message directly to agent B, using a direct communication mecha-
nism. The message transfer, including buffering of messages and any error messages,
must be handled by the sending and receiving agents.
Figure 2.2. Comm. Methods between Different Platforms (Source: FIPA 2002e)
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2.5. Agent Messages
The structure of a message is a key-value-tuple and is written in an agent-
communication language, such as FIPA ACL. The content of the message is expressed in
a content-language. Content expressions can be grounded by ontologies referenced within
the ontology key-value-tuple. The messages also contain the sender and receiver names,
expressed as agent-names. Agent-names are unique name identifiers for an agent. Every
message has one sender and zero or more receivers. The case of zero receivers enables
broadcasting of messages ”(FIPA 2002a)”.
A message is made up of a message envelope, containing transport information,
and a message body comprising of the agent communication data or ACL message. An
ACC should deliver the whole message, including the message envelope, to the receiving
agent. However, it is possible for agent platforms to provide middleware layers to free
agents from the task of processing the envelope.
As shown in Figure 2.3, a message is encoded into a payload suitable for trans-
port over the selected message transport. An appropriate envelope is created that has
sender and receiver information, which uses the transport description data appropriate
to the transport selected. There may be additional envelope data to be included. The
combination of the payload and envelope is termed as a transport-message.
Figure 2.3. Transport Message Generation (Source: FIPA 2002a)
However, the envelope has transport-descriptions containing the information about
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how to send the message (via what transport, to what address, with details about how
to utilize the transport). The envelope can also contain additional information, such as
the encoding-representation, data related security, and other realization specific data that
needs be visible to the transport or recipient(s).
In message validity, messages can be sent in such a way that any modification
during transmission is identifiable. In message encryption, a message is sent in encrypted
form such that non-authorized entities cannot comprehend the message content.
In the FIPA Abstract Architecture ”(FIPA 2002a)”, these features are accom-
modated through encoding-representations and the use of additional attributes in the
envelope. For example, as the payload is encoded, one of the encodings could be to a
digitally encrypted set of data, using a public key and preferred encryption algorithm.
Additional parameters are added to the envelope to indicate these characteristics.
In Figure 2.4, the payload is encrypted, and additional attributes added to the
envelope to support the encryption. These attributes must remain unencrypted in order
that the receiving party is able to use them.
Figure 2.4. Encrypted Message Payload (Source: FIPA 2002a
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After encrypting the message, the message payload includes an unrecognizable
message and any intruder can not obtain an understandable message during communica-
tion.
These concepts will be explained in Chapter 4 with its new specification and im-
plementation details.
2.6. Seagent
SEAGENT is a new agent development platform that is specialized for semantic
web based multi agent system development ”(Dikenelli et al. 2005)”. The communication
and plan execution infrastructure of SEAGENT looks like other existing agent develop-
ment frameworks such as DECAF ”(Graham et al. 2003)”, JADE ”(Bellifemine et al.
2001)”, and RETSINA ”(Sycara et al. 2003)”. However, to support and ease semantic
web based MAS development, SEAGENT includes the following built-in features that the
existing agent frameworks and platforms do not have ”(Dikenelli et al. 2005)”:
• Agents created using SEAGENT handle their internal knowledge base using se-
mantic web standards and the platform provides specifically designed interfaces to
manage and query the internal knowledge without being dependent on a particular
application programming interface.
• The directory service of SEAGENT is implemented in a way that the directory
knowledge is held in semantic web standards and the directory service supports
semantic matching of the agent capabilities to find the semantically similar agents.
• FIPA-RDF”(Fikes et al. 2003)” content language has been used to transfer semantic
content in the agent communication language messages and OWL-QL is integrated
to the FIPA-RDF content language to query the agents and services.
• SEAGENT introduces a new service for managing and translating ontologies. It
provides a means to define mappings between platform ontologies and external on-
tologies. The translation process is based on these defined mappings.
• SEAGENT supports discovery and dynamic invocation of semantic web services by
introducing a new platform service for semantic service discovery and a reusable
agent behavior for dynamic invocation of the discovered services.
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2.6.1. Platform Architecture
Seagent has a layered software architecture. Each layer has been specially designed
to provide build-in support for MAS development on the Semantic Web environment. The
overall architecture is shown in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5. Seagent Platform Overall Architecture (Source: Dikenelli et al. 2005)
Because of interesting in Seagent message security, it would only be explained
about Communication Infrastructure Layer. This layer has an aim of abstracting plat-
forms communication infrastructure implementation. Seagent implements FIPAs Agent
Communication and Agent Message Transport specifications to handle agent messaging.
Although Communication Infrastructure Layer can transfer any content using FIPA ACL
and transport infrastructure, Seagent platform only supports Seagent Content Language
(SCL), a specific OWL ontology to define the ACL content, by default.
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2.6.2. Security for Platform Architecture
According to Figure 2.6, agency, communication infrastructure layer and platform
services are the main affected concerns or Seagent security. By thinking about the end-
to-end security as an initial concern, the communication of agents with secure messages
are determined.
Figure 2.6. Seagent Platform Overall Architecture with Security
There are user agents, service agents and middleware or middle agents such as name
services and directory services. While there are certain entities in the system that for a
variety of reasons such as performance and because of existing practices, some services
are represented as agents and some are not. DF and AMS are implemented as agents and
their communication services between other agents have to be secure. So they have to be
private and public information to be able to provide security.
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User agents and service agents start to communicate with each other after middle
agent operations. During these conversations, after each of these agents have the other
party’s public key information, the secure messaging occurs successfully.
MAS systems are fundamentally message-based as Seagent, therefore threats to the
communication, such as corruption of transmitted data and eavesdropping as explained
in Section 3.3, need to be guarded against. A traditional safeguard for asynchronous
communication in Seagent is to provide a secure envelope for each message sent, on a
per message basis. The FIPA Message Transport service specification ”(FIPA 2002e)”
specifies an optional tag in the message transport envelope for security. This tag shows
the message’s security features and the other agent can understand what it should process
on this message.
In Seagent, ”Security” field of the message envelope is thought as per message
basis. There is no abstraction to specify message security for a group of messages such as
on a per session or on a per interaction sequence. Each individual message is processed
individually. On the other hand, synchronous message security models such as the Secure
Socket Layer (SSL) message specification do contain the concept of a message stream.
FIPA MAS can exchange messages using a FIPA specified MTP (Message Transport
Protocol) such as HTTP over a lower level security protocol such as SSL. However, SSL is
at a much lower level of abstraction than the level of the agent communication interaction
sequences.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURITY CONCEPTS
3.1. Overview
Information security is a term used to describe the process of protecting informa-
tion and services from misuse or destruction. Before the widespread use of data processing
equipment, data and information valuable to an organization were made invulnerable pri-
marily by physical and administrative means. With the advent of computer networks and
the internet however, the design of automated tools which ensure security and privacy
of information transferred across networks was inevitable. Especially the introduction
of distributed systems and the use of networks and communication facilities for carrying
data between different hosts or computers has introduced a major challenge for security.
Then the concerns about security have been reconstructed.
Secure systems are designed so that the cost of breaking any component of the
system outweighs the rewards. Cost is usually measured in money, time, and risk, both
legal and personal. The benefits of breaking systems are generally control, money, or
information that can be sold for money. The security of the system should be proportional
to the resources it protects ”(Knudsen 1998)”.
To assess the security needs of an organization effectively and to evaluate and
choose various security products and policies, the manager responsible for security needs
some systematic way of defining the requirements for security and characterizing the
approaches to satisfying those requirements. One approach is to consider three aspects of
information security ”(Stallings 2003)”:
• Security attack: Any action that compromises the security of information owned
by an organization.
• Security mechanism: A mechanism that is designed to detect, prevent, or recover
from a security attack.
• Security service: A service that enhances the security of the data processing
systems and the information transfers of an organization.
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The services are intended to counter security attacks, and they make use of one or more
security mechanisms to provide the service.
3.2. Security Concerns
Cryptography is the science of secret writing. It’s a branch of mathematics, part of
cryptology. Cryptology has one other child, cryptanalysis, which is the science of breaking
(analyzing) cryptography.
At the application programming level, there are many options for making a pro-
gram secure. Cryptography is the biggest tool for the application programmer. But it is
important to realize that a cryptographically enabled program is not necessarily a secure
one. Without a carefully planned and constantly scrutinized security strategy, cryptog-
raphy won’t do much good performance.
Correctly used, cryptography provides these standard security features ”(Knudsen
1998)”:
• Confidentiality assures that data cannot be viewed by unauthorized people.
• Integrity assures that data has not been changed without the sender’s knowledge.
• Authentication assures that sender deals with correct receiver, not with imposters.
3.2.1. Confidentiality
With respect to the content of a data transmission, several levels of protection can
be identified. The broadest service protects all user data transmitted between two users
over a period of time. Narrower forms of this service can also be defined, including the
protection of a single message or even specific fields within a message. Confidentiality
is also determined for the protection of traffic flow. This requires that an attacker not
be able to observe the source and destination,frequency,length or other communication
facilities.
A common way to protect information is to encrypt it at the sending end and de-
crypt it at the receiving end. Encryption is the process of taking data, called plaintext, and
mathematically transforming it into an unreadable mess, called ciphertext. Decryption
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takes the ciphertext and transforms it back into plaintext. The mathematical algorithm
that performs the transformations is called a cipher. Figure 3.1 shows how this works.
Figure 3.1. Operation of a Cipher (Source: Knudsen 1998)
Useful ciphers use keys to encrypt and decrypt data. A key is a secret value. If
you encrypt the same plaintext using different keys, you will get different ciphertexts.
Similarly, ciphertext can only be decrypted to the original plaintext using the proper key.
3.2.1.1. Confidentiality Levels
According to FIPA Agent Security Management Specification ”(FIPA 1998)”, an
agent can request a low, medium, or high level of confidentiality. These confidentiality
levels are provided so that the agent is not burdened with the responsibility of deciding
on specific security mechanisms, but is only responsible for determining the sensitivity of
the data which it produces. These levels are shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2. Confidentiality Levels (Source: FIPA 1998)
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3.2.1.2. Confidentiality Mechanisms
Confidentiality mechanisms that could be used by agent security applications are
shown in Figure 3.3. Alternatively, an agent can request a specific security mechanism
to ensure confidentiality. According to chosen confidentiality level, confidentiality mech-
anism can be more specific.
Figure 3.3. Confidentiality Mechanisms (Source: FIPA 1998)
3.2.2. Symmetric Encryption Algorithms
Symmetric encryption, or secret-key encryption, uses a secret key to encrypt a
message into ciphertext and the same key to decrypt the ciphertext into the original
message.
Symmetric cryptography, which includes symmetric encryption, requires the sender
and receiver to agree on a shared secret key. Symmetric cryptography is in general more
efficient in terms of computing resources than asymmetric cryptography.
In symmetric cryptography, the key has to be kept secret, and you have to trust
your recipient to keep the key a secret also. If someone else obtains the key, you and your
recipient have to agree on a new key in a secure manner.
Operation of the symmetric key encryption scheme is shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4. Operation of Symmetric Encryption (Source: Knudsen 1998)
Symmetric ciphers come in two varieties. Block ciphers encrypt and decrypt fixed-
size blocks of data, usually 64 bits long. Stream ciphers operate on a stream of bits or
bytes. A block cipher can be made to work like a stream cipher, using the appropriate
mode. The use of computers in cryptography has led to the creation of block ciphers, in
which a message is broken into blocks. The cipher encrypts or decrypts one block at a
time. If data has been encrypted between the client and server with a block cipher, server
has to wait until the client typed enough characters to fill a block. In this case, a stream
cipher is better suited to the task.
3.2.2.1. Data Encryption Standard(DES-56)
DES encrypts a plaintext bitstring x of length 64 using a key K which is a bitstring
of length 56, obtaining a ciphertext bitstring which is again a bitstring of length 64. The
algorithm proceeds in three stages ”(Stinson 1995)”:
1. Given a plaintext x, a bitstring x0 is constructed by permuting the bits of x according
to a (fixed) initial permutation IP. It is written that x0 = IP (x) = L0R0, where L0
comprises the first 32 bits of x0 and R0 the last 32 bits.
2. 16 iterations of a certain function are then computed, LiRi.
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Figure 3.5. One round of DES Encryption (Source: Stinson 1995)
1 ≤ i ≤ 16, according to the following rule:
• Li = Ri−1
• Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1, Ki)
where ⊕ denotes the exclusive-or of two bitstrings. f is a function that has been
described below, and K1, K2, . . . , K16 are each bitstrings of length 48 computed
as a function of the key K. (Actually, each Ki is a permuted selection of bits from
K.) K1, K2, . . . , K16 comprises the key schedule. One round of encryption is
depicted in Figure 3.5.
3. It has been applied the inverse permutation IP−1 to the bitstring R16L16, obtaining
the ciphertext y. That is, y = IP−1(R16L16).
The function f takes as input a first argument A, which is a bitstring of length
32, and a second argument J that is a bitstring of length 48, and produces as output
a bitstring of length 32. The first argument A is expanded to a bitstring of length 48
according to a fixed expansion function E. E(A) consists of the 32 bits from A, permuted
in a certain way, with 16 of the bits appearing twice. Then E(A) ⊕ J is computed. Eight
6 bit string result is processed with S boxes, 4*16 array whose entries come from the
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integers 0 - 15. The resulting bitstring C = C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8 of length 32 is permuted
according to a fixed permutation P. The resulting bitstring P(C) is defined to be f(A, J).
The f function is depicted in Figure 3.6. Basically, it consists of a substitution (using an
S-box) followed by the (fixed) permutation P. The 16 iterations of f comprise a product
cryptosystem.
Figure 3.6. The DES f Function (Source: Stinson 1995)
3.2.2.2. Triple DES
Triple DES has been the answer to many of the shortcomings of DES. Since it
is based on the DES algorithm, it is very easy to modify existing software to use Triple
DES. It also has the advantage of proven reliability and a longer key length that eliminates
many of the shortcut attacks that can be used to reduce the amount of time it takes to
break DES.
Triple DES is simply another mode of DES operation. It takes three 64-bit keys,
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for an overall key length of 192 bits. The procedure for encryption is exactly the same
as regular DES, but it is repeated three times. The data is encrypted with the first
key, decrypted with the second key, and finally encrypted again with the third key as in
Equation 3.1 ”(Stallings 2003)”.
C = EK3 [DK2 [EK1 [P ]]] (3.1)
where
C=ciphertext
P=plaintext
EK [X]=encryption of X using key K
DK [Y ]=decryption of Y using key K
Decryption is simply the same operation with the keys reversed as in Equation
3.2.
P = DK1 [EK2 [DK3 [C]]] (3.2)
Consequently, Triple DES runs three times slower than standard DES, but is much
more secure if used properly. The procedure for decrypting something is the same as the
procedure for encryption, except it is executed in reverse. Like DES, data is encrypted
and decrypted in 64-bit chunks. Unfortunately, there are some weak keys that one should
be aware of: if all three keys, the first and second keys, or the second and third keys are
the same, then the encryption procedure is essentially the same as standard DES. This
situation is to be avoided because it is the same as using a really slow version of regular
DES.
Although the input key for DES is 64 bits long, the actual key used by DES is only
56 bits in length. The least significant (right-most) bit in each byte is a parity bit, and
should be set so that there are always an odd number of 1s in every byte. These parity
bits are ignored, so only the seven most significant bits of each byte are used, resulting
in a key length of 56 bits. This means that the effective key strength for Triple DES is
actually 168 bits because each of the three keys contains 8 parity bits that are not used
during the encryption process.
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3.2.2.3. Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)
AES is a symmetric block cipher with a block length of 128 bits and support for key
lengths of 128,192 and 256 bits ”(Stallings 2003)”. It is fast and compact with a simple
mathematical structure that eliminated much of the cumbersome overhead of 3DES. AES
is also easily implemented in hardware, can be integrated into a wide range of electronic
systems requiring secure data transactions.
3.2.3. Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms
Asymmetric cryptography, or public-key cryptography, involves the use of two
distinct keys, one public and one private. The private key is kept secret by its owner,
while the public key can be freely shared with everyone. There are a number of different
types of asymmetric cryptographic schemes, including encryption schemes and digital
signatures.
While asymmetric cryptography does not, like symmetric cryptography, rely on the
sender and receiver agreeing on a shared secret, the user of the public key must ensure
that the correct key is used. Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) are used for this purpose.
Figure 3.7. Public-Key Cryptography
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Data encrypted using the public key can be decrypted using the private key. No
other key will decrypt the data, and the private key will decrypt only data that was
encrypted using the matching public key. In some cases, the reverse of the process also
works; data encrypted with the private key can be decrypted with the public key.
Asymmetric ciphers are much slower than symmetric ciphers, so they are not
usually used to encrypt long messages.
3.2.3.1. RSA
RSA is by far the most popular public-key cryptography algorithm. It supports
both encryption and digital signatures. It is also the easiest one to describe and imple-
ment.
In RSA, a public key is based on the product of two large prime numbers. These
two numbers must be kept secret as they are used to compute the private key. The
product of the two prime numbers is referred to as modulus. The security of RSA lies in
the difficulty of factoring large numbers.
RSA supports variable key lengths, especially 512 bits. Block size can be variable.
Plaintext must be shorter than key length and ciphertext must be with the same size of
key length.
Encryption(Equation 3.3) and decryption(Equation 3.4) are of the following form,
for some plaintext block M and ciphertext block ”(Stallings 2003)”:
C=Me (mod n) (3.3)
M=Cd(mod n)=(Me)d(mod n)=Med(mod n) (3.4)
Both sender and receiver must know the values of n and e, and only the receiver
knows the value of d. This is a public-key encryption algorithm with a public key of
KU={e,n} and a private key of KR={d, n}.
Public-private key pair is generated as shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8. RSA Key Generation
If p and q is known, encryption/decryption is easy (modular exponentiation). If
p and q is not known, finding the private key is equivalent to trying to factor n=pq into
its prime factors. RSA is an effective algorithm because of difficulty for factoring large
numbers.
3.2.4. Hybrid Systems
Hybrid systems combine symmetric and asymmetric ciphers. The beginning of a
conversation involves some negotiation, carried out using an asymmetric cipher, where
the participants agree on a private key, or session key. The session key is used with a
symmetric cipher to encrypt the remainder of the conversation. The session key’s life is
over when the two participants finish their conversation. If they have a new conversation,
they’ll generate a new session key, which makes the cryptanalyst’s job harder.
Seagent security uses hybrid systems to share session keys between agents.
3.2.5. Integrity
Data integrity is a service which addresses the unauthorized alteration of data. It
does this by detecting data manipulation by unauthorized entities.
A message digest can be used to verify data integrity. It is used to turn input of
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arbitrary length into an output of fixed length. This output can then be used in place of
the original input. This has many advantages. The output always has the same length,
so this can be taken into account when processing or storing the message digest. Also,
the output is much shorter than the input, so that processing and storing can be done
much quicker.
To make this work, a message digest function should have two properties:
1. Given a particular message digest, it should be very difficult to find an input that
has the same message digest.
2. It should be very difficult to find two inputs that have the same message digest.
The first property prevents taking a particular digest and using it in connection
with another message. Message can’t be known because of this first property.
The second property means that if two inputs produce the same message digest,
they must be the same input as well. Often the second requirement is taken even further:
if a message is changed slightly, the message digest of the changed message should have
changed a great deal.
To verify whether the received message is identical to the original, the recipient
computes the hash of the received file. This hash is then compared to the hash of the
original file. If these two are identical, integrity is verified.
3.2.5.1. Integrity Mechanisms
Integrity mechanisms that could be used by agent security applications are shown
in Figure 3.9. Alternatively, an agent can request a specific integrity mechanism to ensure
integrity.
Although other integrity mechanisms could be easily adapted to Seagent, MD5 is
used to provide integrity. So only MD5 is explained in this thesis.
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Figure 3.9. Integrity Mechanisms (Source: FIPA 1998)
3.2.5.2. Message Digest Algorithm(MD5)
MD5 is a widely-used cryptographic hash function with a 128-bit hash value. MD5
processes a variable length message into a fixed-length output of 128 bits. The input
message is broken up into chunks of 512-bit blocks; the message is padded so that its
length is divisible by 512. The padding works as follows: first a single bit, 1, is appended
to the end of the message. This is followed by as many zeros as are required to bring the
length of the message up to 64 bits fewer than a multiple of 512. The remaining bits are
filled up with a 64-bit integer representing the length of the original message.
The main MD5 algorithm operates on a 128-bit state, divided into four 32-bit
words. These are initialized to certain fixed constants. The main algorithm then operates
on each 512-bit message block in turn, each block modifying the state. The processing of
a message block consists of four similar stages, termed rounds; each round is composed of
16 similar operations based on a non-linear function, modular addition, and left rotation.
There are four possible functions that is used in each round.
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3.2.6. Authentication
Authentication is provided to guarantee that entities are who they claim to be,
or that information has not been manipulated by unauthorized parties ”(Menezes et al.
1997)”. Secrecy and authentication were truly separate and independent information
security objectives.
It may at first not seem important to separate the two but there are situations
where it is not only useful but essential. For example, if a two-party communication
between Alice and Bob is to take place where Alice is in one country and Bob in another,
the host countries might not permit secrecy on the channel; one or both countries might
want the ability to monitor all communications. Alice and Bob, however, would like to
be assured of the identity of each other, and of the integrity and origin of the information
they send and receive.
An asymmetric cipher can be used for authentication. It is supposed that Alice en-
crypts her message using her private key. When Bob receives Alice’s message, he decrypts
it using her public key. He can be sure that the file is from Alice because only Alice’s
private key could have encrypted the file in the first place. This type of authentication
is called as data origin authentication. Seagent security is especially interested in data
origin authentication.
3.2.7. Digital Signature
Digital signature is data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data
unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data
unit and protect against forgery(e.g. by the recipient) ”(Stallings 2003)”.
The twin requirements to give assurance that a message is generated by a given
entity (Data Origin Authentication), and to give assurance that it has not subsequently
been altered (Data Integrity) cannot be separated. For if a message has been altered then
this can be viewed as a change of origin. And if an origin cannot be determined then
there is no basis from which to discuss alteration ”(Gordon 1998)”.
A signature scheme consists of two components: a signing algorithm and a ver-
ification algorithm. Bob can sign a message x using a (secret) signing algorithm sig.
The resulting signature sig(x) can subsequently be verified using a public verification al-
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gorithm ver. Given a pair (x, y), the verification algorithm returns an answer true or
false depending on whether the signature is authentic. RSA public-key cryptosystem to
provide digital signatures is shown below ”(Stinson 1995)”:
Definition 3.2..1. Let n = pq, where p and q are primes. Let P = A = Zn, and define
K = {(n, p, q, a, b) : n = pq, p, q prime, ab ≡ 1(modφ(n))}
The values n and b are public, and the values p, q, a are secret.
For K = (n, p, q, a, b), define
sigK(x) = x
a (mod n) (3.5)
and
verK(x, y) = true⇔ x ≡ yb (mod n) (3.6)
(x, y²Zn)
Seagent security implements above digital signature scheme by using one of the
Java’s implemented algorithms as RSAwithMD5.
3.2.8. Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation means to ensure that a transferred message has been sent and
received by the parties claiming to have sent and received the message. Non-repudiation
is a way to guarantee that the sender of a message cannot later deny having sent the
message and that the recipient cannot deny having received the message.
Non-repudiation can be obtained through the use of:
• Digital signatures function as a unique identifier for an individual.
• Confirmation services can create digital receipts to indicated that messages were
sent and/or received.
• Timestamps contain the date and time a document was composed and proves that
a document existed at a certain time.
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CHAPTER 4
AGENT PLATFORM SECURITY
4.1. Security Attacks
Security attacks are divided into two categories, passive and active attacks. Passive
attacks relates to attacks on confidentiality to assets, while active attacks relates to attacks
on integrity and availability to assets ”(Stallings 2003)”.
Security attacks related to confidentiality ”(Houmb 2002)”:
• Eavesdropping
• Traffic analysis
Eavesdropping is an attack where the attacker exposes some or all of the content
in a message. This is achieved by tapping data sent on the network either through special
equipment (hardware), software, or by an attacker acting as a man in the middle. When
an outsider (or insider) acts as a man in the middle, all information is sent through the
attacker on its way to its destination. Traffic analysis does not reveal any of the content
in the message but monitors and probably also logs where and to whom the information
is sent. An attacker could then be able to predict the nature of the information sent,
based on the size of the messages and on the sender and the receiver.
Security attacks related to integrity ”(Houmb 2002)”:
• Modification of message contents
• Masquerade
• Fabrication
• Replay
Modification of message contents is an attack where the attacker alters some or
all of the content in a message when being transported over the network, or stored on a
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storage device. Masquerade is an attack where the attacker acts on behalf of the original
sender or receiver. Fabrication is an attack where the attacker forges a message.
Security attacks related to availability ”(Houmb 2002)”:
• Denial of service
• Masquerade
• Fabrication
• Replay
Denial of service is an attack where services or resources are blocked for autho-
rized use or when a client or a server is exposed to such exhausting load that they are
not capable of performing normal activities. Denial of service also relates to all types of
network problems, such as unstable network communication, other problems with the net-
work connection or simply because someone has removed or destroyed the communication
medium. In this case the attack could be intended or unintended. Fabrication, masquer-
ade and replay in connection with availability relate to situations where the purpose is to
prevent legal access ”(Houmb 2002)”.
4.1.1. Security Attacks Through Agent Communication
When security attacks are thought about agents, firstly three properties of agents
have to be concerned ”(Poslad et al. 2001)”:
1. Agents communicate with other agents using syntactically and semantically rich
complex messages.
2. Agents make heavy use of facilitators, match-makers and brokers to discover and
hence interoperate and cooperate with unknown agents.
3. Agents within one domain or agency interact with agents in other autonomous
domains or agencies.
A common way to break into a distributed system is to cause the message handler
to fail leaving the system in a state where remote access rights are increased. Due to
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the complexity of agent interaction (Figure 4.1), many different kinds of syntactic and
semantic attack can occur, causing the system to fail.
Figure 4.1. Comm. of agents using rich complex messages (Source: Poslad et al. 2001)
Agents frequently interoperate with other agents in order to jointly solve tasks
they cannot solve themselves. This provides agents with fault-tolerance during dynamic
service provision. But in order to find a suitable provider agent, agents frequently make
use of other intermediary or mediator agents (Figure 4.2). A service agent registers with a
directory agent, that directory agent registers with another directory agent. A user agent
searches a remote directory agent via a local directory agent in order to locate a suitable
remote service. The mediator services become an obvious focus for Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks, masquerades of one agent by a different agent and the introduction of
faulty services that individually or in combination can disrupt the whole agency ”(Poslad
et al. 2001)”.
Agents within one agency can often need to interact with agents in another agency,
for example, because particular services do no reside in the local agency (Figure 4.3).
Whereas it is not that difficult to develop a trust model within individual agencies, it
is far more complex to develop trust models that enable co-operation between multiple
autonomous agencies that perhaps have their own policies for interoperation ”(Poslad
et al. 2001)”.
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Figure 4.2. Mediators to interoperate with unknown agents (Source: Poslad et al. 2001)
When the use of the mediator agents is considered, for example authenticate write
access can be given to the mediator agents - this would help guard against one agent
masquerading as another. However, it could be easily tie up the mediator with frequent
multiple reads and cause a DoS. It could be prevented by introducing authentication for
read access but this would interfere with bootstrapping the system and hinder unknown
agents having the option of browsing an agencys information before it joins it. If the me-
diator behaves as an intermediary between a first-party and second-party agent, different
encryption schemes and privacy schemes could be improved to share information with the
second party but protect it from the third party and vice versa ”(Poslad et al. 2001)”.
When multi agent system interaction is considered, each agency is easily protected
by using firewalls, secure channels, access control and authentication against agents out-
side the agency. However, if multiple MAS need to cooperate, it is needed to reveal some
aspects of the system security to other agencies that are autonomous to first agency, and
first agency may be currently uncertain how to trust them ”(Poslad et al. 2001)”.
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Figure 4.3. Multi agent system interactions (Source: Poslad et al. 2001)
For communication between agents executing on separate hosts, encryption is typ-
ically required for confidentiality protection. An agent can include the required function-
ality for encryption/decryption and its associated key management functionality. This
might be a desirable solution for certain applications. Depending on the device, this
might be implemented in software only, but may also be assisted by special hardware.
Similarly, integrity functionality can be implemented within the agent ”(Poslad et al.
2001)”.
For communication between agents executing on the same host, confidentiality and
integrity of communication are assumed to be provided by the platform. The platform
needs to separate agents in such a way that information leakage and manipulation are
prohibited. To further protect the communication between agents on the same host would
not make sense, since the party in physical control of the host (who would be the only
other potential threat) will have direct access to agents anyway. If further protection is
required physical measures must be used ”(Poslad et al. 2001)”.
Seagent security considers to provide security of messages and authentication of
data origin. So message alteration, message corruption and message reading by unautho-
rized parties is discouraged by Seagent end-to-end encryption mechanisms. In the test
environment of Seagent, usage of the agents on the same host makes the security concept
easier for the programmer for discarding the physical control.
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4.1.2. Important Issues Against Security Attacks Through
Agent Communication
As application communication becomes more semantic and as standard interac-
tion becomes richer to support the increasing number of open service spaces to support
dynamic service providers, much more finely grained asset model of communication is
needed ”(Poslad et al. 2003)”.
A more finely grained model of agent communication can be viewed as a set of
four layers that the issues should be considered with respect to providing security at each
of these levels ”(Poslad et al. 2003)”:
• Transport level issues: There is already much existing work in the area of mes-
sage transport between processes, especially in the context of client-server models.
Therefore, sending messages between agents is not necessarily relegated entirely to
some existing controllable transport, so existing transport-level security may not
necessarily cover agent message-passing. For instance, agents may use forward mes-
sages through proxy agents. So it is not clear that relying entirely on existing
transport-level security is desirable.
• Communicative act issues: The addition of new communicative acts to access
the security service has the advantage of simplicity.For example, adding new speech
acts as apply-certificate, issue-certificate, renew-certificate, update-certificate and
revoke-certificate for certification process. This approach could have been adopted
for agent management in the agent management specification. The disadvantage is
that FIPA has resisted adding service or application specific speech acts, for example
for security, in order to keep the core set of speech acts generic and to a minimum.
Rather than introduce new speech acts, an ontological approach is introduced as a
powerful alternative approach.
• Ontology level issues: Making use of the existing FIPA speech acts and interac-
tion protocols but referencing one or more security ontologies would minimize the
changes to the existing ACL specifications to support security. It may be benefi-
cial if FIPA seeks to reuse existing security schema from the mainstream computer
network community. However, as most security specifications are quite narrow, it
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is unlikely that a single security ontology could be specified.
• Interaction protocol level issues: Firstly, it has to be said that providing se-
curity at the level at the interaction protocol level is that conversations naturally
provide session keys between agents. One natural paradigm is that an agent, wish-
ing to interact with another agent in the context of some task, can authenticate
itself to that agent; the agents can then share public keys that are valid for the
duration of the interaction.
A given security implementation may have the potential to influence the interaction
protocols themselves. For instance, if authentication becomes a part of every inter-
action among FIPA agents, this could either become embedded in the interaction
protocols themselves.
In Seagent design considerations, the interaction protocol level is important. Ac-
cording to developed interaction protocol, the security concerns of Seagent are realized
successfully.
4.2. Challenges in Multi Agent System Security
There are many challenges that the agent community needs to overcome in order
to develop security as shown below ”(Poslad et al. 2001)”:
1. Security is very complex, agent systems are just specialized distributed systems.
Secure distributed systems can only be developed by, or have already been solved
by, security experts - delegate security issues to them.
2. Security is part of the software infrastructure in which the agent platform is embed-
ded and it is outside the scope of an agent architecture.
3. There is no benefit for security to be either monitored or controlled at the level of
agents (at the application layer).
4. Some agents’ systems do not need security. The early focus on the MAS community
was on collaborative, rational, agent services within closed Intranets.
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5. Security is domain and platform (implementation) specific - there is no general
agent security architecture that is suitable for all applications and implementations.
Hence, there is no reason for a general standard.
6. Complete specifications, and models of agent systems and agent security need to be
completed before designing and building secure agent systems.
”These hypotheses are interrelated. At one level, the first four hypotheses all boil
down the belief that security can be handled properly in the supporting infrastructure
for agents rather than at the agent layer. To refuse or support these four hypotheses the
similarities and differences between agent-systems and the application domains need to
be understood in which they are being deployed and, conventional distributed systems
and their associated domains.
The fifth and sixth hypotheses suggest an approach coupled with a top-down ap-
proach to develop secure agent systems. This may be useful but there are many agent
systems already in operation. These could benefit from bottom-up approaches coupled to
inductive development of agent security models ”(Poslad et al. 2001)”.”
In Seagent, the security concern is tried to be developed as a supporting infrastruc-
ture. The service layer and the mechanisms that are related to the software architecture
has been decoupled from the agent layer. However, the Seagent security is developed after
the agent infrastructure of Seagent. So the bottom-up approach is applied to the Seagent
platform. This has been an advantage that the security mechanism has been tried on the
deployed communication layer to be able to see the results of the security approach.
4.3. Security System Requirements For Agents
Security mechanisms, described in the only published FIPA security specification
”(FIPA 1998)” aren’t enough for the requirements at all. Then some additional require-
ments and dissimilarities from mentioned FIPA specification and outline of solution are
discussed. The mostly discussed issues are shown below ”(Nova´k et al. 2003)”:
• It is possible to secure not only the whole ACL Message but only its part is required
as well. Signing certain part of text or data for storing in database along with its
signature and guarantee its authentication for later use (record of transactions) or
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encrypt only password required for access to particular resource, to allow subsequent
detection of kind of requested data (e.g. from log file). This can be reached using
the structure (class) containing not only carried text (signed or encrypted) but
also additional information concerning security (type of security action, created
signature, identification of used key). On the receiving side, this structure (class) is
processed and original text obtained.
In Seagent, payload is encrypted and signed as well. There is an asymmetric encryp-
tion for only the session key is used, not the whole payload. But payload encryption
is an important concern to be explained.
Asymmetric cryptography (also known as public key cryptography) is well suited
for a mobile agent that needs to send back results to its owner or which collects in-
formation along its route before returning with its encrypted payload to its owner.
This is due to the fact that the encryption key does not need to be kept secret.
However, to encrypt very small messages is either very insecure or results in a large
overhead compared with the original message. A solution called sliding encryp-
tion has been proposed that allows small amounts of data to be encrypted, and
consequently added to the cryptogram, such that the length of the resulting cipher-
text is minimized. Due to the nature of asymmetric cryptography the agent is not
able to access its own encrypted payload until arriving at a trusted host where the
corresponding decryption key is available.
• It is preferably not to bind security support tightly into the agent platform because
agents can run on different platforms (without this type of security) or even without
platform. For example agent collects data from appropriate server, running on
different operating system, and provides data to MAS (in secure way).
• Security algorithms have to be concerned by security module automatically in secure
communication. Negotiation about security algorithms can be very time-consuming
on occasional connection. If agent sends over such connection message with security
algorithm which recipient does not understand, recipient cannot inform the sender
about it immediately.
• All private keys and other security related data have to be available to their owner
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only. Data have not to be accessible to anyone else (even the agent platform). Plat-
form can be distributed across many computers and hence it is impossible to ensure
security within the whole platform, if the private data are managed by platform.
Every agent has to keep its private data secured, even during its migration on other
platform.
4.4. FIPA Specified Security Concepts
According to FIPA specification ”(Vitaglione et al. 2003)”, per message security
means that each individual ACL message contains the security information required to
process the embedded security safeguards. Agents are intended to process the security
mechanisms themselves where appropriate so as to provided end-to-end (or peer-to-peer)
security.
The security information required to process security safeguards needs to be trans-
mitted within the FIPA TransportMessage. The SecurityObject introduces the generic
placeholder for such information, just like the ReceivedObject already represents stamps
placed by the MTS. For instance, if the message is signed, the SecurityObject contains
the signature of the message.
In order to ensure integrity or confidentiality of an entire ACL Message, most
safeguards need to apply only to the message payload, therefore SecurityObject is attached
to the message Envelope. The SecurityObject can be included as user-defined slot into the
envelope (e.g. X-Security), or, if standardized by FIPA, as an optional slot (e.g. Security).
Furthermore, the slot containing the SecurityObject can contain a set of SecurityObjects,
according to the different safeguards applied to a message, just as the envelope can already
contain several ReceivedObjects ”(Vitaglione et al. 2003)”. Seagent security uses this
strategy as adding Security slot to the message Envelope.
SecurityObject must include all the information required by the message receiver
to perform message authentication and decrypt the payload. To be able to manage these
properties, it has a FIPA specification that includes all necessary information as shown
in Figure 4.4.
Signatures can be used in order to provide data integrity and data origin authen-
tication as mentioned before. When communication relies on message exchange, each
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message can be signed by the sender in such a way that the receiver can verify the valid-
ity of the signature. The verification results allow the receiver of the message to securely
evaluate the information integrity and the identity of the sender. The payload has not
been modified between signature calculation and verification, therefore signatures can be
applied to a FIPA ACL message by calculating the signature over the encoded payload.
This allows protecting the information included into all ACL slots. The envelope’s Se-
curity slot is used for the sending and receiving of this signature as shown in Figure
4.5.
Figure 4.4. FIPA Security Object Specification (Source: Vitaglione et al. 2003)
The sender owns a cryptographic public/private key pair. He calculates the sig-
nature = f( payload ). f is a non invertible function, calculated by the asymmetrically
encrypted(RSA) hash function(MD5) calculated over the payload. The encryption is pro-
cessed by the sender’s private key. The verification process consists in asymmetrically
decrypt (using the senders public key) the message signature to have the hash of the
payload at the source. Then the hash is calculated over the received payload. If the two
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hashes are equal, the integrity of payload is ensured as well as the origin of the message.
Figure 4.5. SecurityObject for the signature of a message (Source: Vitaglione et al. 2003)
Figure 4.6. SecurityObject for the encryption information (Source: Vitaglione et al. 2003)
In the encryption scenario, the SecurityObject contains the information required
by the receiver to decrypt the payload. There are different sub-scenarios, depending if the
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payload has been encrypted with a symmetric or asymmetric algorithm, if the symmetric
secret-key is known by the receiver, etc.
4.5. Overview of Security Related Scenarios
It has been presented a series of simple security-related scenarios to illustrate some
of the security issues ”(FIPA 2001)”:
• Publisher/directory scenario
• Courier/broker scenario
• Task allocation scenario
4.5.1. Publisher/Directory Scenario
Assume that there are 5 agents:
• User Agent wants to make a reservation for a hotel.
• Hotel Agent1 gives reservation service.
• Hotel Agent2 gives reservation service.
• Agent X is a malicious agent.
• FIPA DF agent acts as a directory/publisher for services by different vendors ”(FIPA
2004)”. All directory entries are in DF agent directories are public.
Hotel Agent1 and Hotel Agent2 register their services with a Directory Service,
e.g., DF. Given the current FIPA specifications, Agent X can:
1. Pretend to be Hotel Agent2 and change service description of Hotel Agent2 at the
DF, declaring that Hotel Agent2 now gives another service, not reservation service.
In this way agent Hotel Agent2 will not be able to make any profit since it will be
asked to provide a service that it is not able to support and nobody will ask it for
the real service it is able to provide.
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2. Pretend to be User Agent and places and reserves 10 rooms from Hotel Agent1.
Therefore, Hotel Agent1 books 10 rooms. But there is not any customer that can
use these rooms. Hotel1 will cost these rooms because of not using these rooms on
that day.
3. Pretend to be Hotel Agent1 and book rooms although these rooms can be booked
before. This situation may confuse the hotel’s work plan.
4. Pretend to be a multitude of customers and overload Hotel Agent1 and Hotel Agent2
with fake offers to be processed resulting in valid service offers becoming delayed
and perhaps causing them to be subsequently withdrawn.
5. Intercept and replay any message between Hotel Agent1, Hotel Agent2 and User
Agent.
In this scenario, main security concerns are:
• Lack of authentication: an agent can masquerade as another agent(list items 1-3).
• Authorisation problems/lack of access of control:
– a masquerading agent is authorized to change another agents published service
description(list item 1).
– any agent can also read any service provider agents entry in the DF(list item
1).
• Service Disruption: a masquerading agent can disrupt the normal service provision
of that agent by making untrustable requests(list item 1).
• Denial of Service Attack(list items 2-4).
• Replay Attack(list item 5).
4.5.2. Courier/Broker Scenario
A broker is an agent that offers a set of communication facilitation services to other
agents using some knowledge about the requirements and capabilities of those agents. A
typical example of brokering is one in which an agent can request a broker to find one or
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more agents who can answer a query. The broker then determines a set of appropriate
agents to which to forward the query, sends the query to those agents and relays their
answers back to the original requestor. The use of brokerage agents can significantly sim-
plify the task of interaction with agents in a multi-agent system. Additionally, brokering
agents also enable a system to be adaptable and robust in dynamic situations, supporting
scalability and security control at the brokering agent ”(FIPA 2002c)”.
According to above definitions,Seagent agent mechanisms are used below for this
scenario. The main security concerns that are explained in Section 3.2. are shown in a
life time scenario.
When it is assumed that there are three agents:
• User Agent
• Hotel Agent
• A courier agent (broker) agent acts as an intermediary for all messages between
Hotel Agent and User Agent. This type of condition is also called as man in the
middle attack in security concept.
If all discourse between User Agent and Hotel Agent is via the courier agent, the
following security related problems could occur:
1. The courier agent can open up messages between User Agent and Hotel Agent and
observe their contents.
2. The courier agent can modify the messages between User Agent and Hotel Agent.
3. The courier agent can insert messages from other parties to masquerade as User
Agent or Hotel Agent.
4. User Agent can deny having sent a message, the courier can deny having been called
to deliver it, Hotel Agent can deny having received a sent message.
In this scenario, main security concerns are:
• Lack of privacy: The courier agent can open up and see the contents of messages
between User Agent and Hotel Agent(list item 1).
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• Lack of integrity: The courier agent can misrepresent or corrupt messages between
User Agent and Hotel Agent(list item 2).
• Lack of authentication: An agent can masquerade as another agent(list item 3).
• Repudiation: An agent can deny that an event such as a message transmission or
message delivery has occurred(list item 4).
4.5.3. Task Allocation Scenario
In this scenario ”(FIPA 2002d)”, the manager agent wishes to have some task
performed by one or more other agents, and further wishes to optimize a function that
characterizes the task. This characteristic is commonly expressed as the price, in some
domain specific way, but could also be soonest time to completion, fair distribution of
tasks, etc.
The manager solicits proposals from other agents that specifies the task and any
conditions the manager is placing upon the execution of the task. Agents receiving the
call for proposals are viewed as potential contractors, and are able to generate proposals to
perform the task. They may also be able to sub-contract the task to another contractors,
behaving as a manager in this level of interaction. The contractors proposal includes the
preconditions that the contractor is setting out for the task, which may be the price, time
when the task will be done, etc. Alternatively, the contractor may refuse to propose. Once
the manager receives back replies from all of the contractors, it evaluates the proposals
and makes its choice of which agents will perform the task. One, several, or no agents
may be chosen. The agents of the selected proposal(s) will be sent an acceptance message,
the others will receive a notice of rejection. The proposals are assumed to be binding on
the contractor, so that once the manager accepts the proposal the contractor acquires a
commitment to perform the task. Once the contractor has completed the task, it sends a
completion message to the manager.
This scenario is widely used in Seagent. By using the list of agents as given in
Section 4.5.1. and Section 4.5.2., User Agent sends prices as call for proposals and Hotel
Agents reply to these messages as agree or refuse communicative act messages according
to their decision. The most suitable price is chosen between the agents and the interaction
of messages end when User Agent obtains the necessary information for it. With the agree
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communicative act, User and Hotel Agent interaction goes on although rejection of an
offer ends the conversation between these two agents.
When attacks through the interaction is determined between the user and the
service agents, the following security related problems could occur ”(FIPA 2001)”. Al-
though this list is not exhaustive it is not assured too much, they can be recognized as
main concerns:
1. The rejected Hotel Agent can deny having received a rejection instead of an accep-
tance.
2. User Agent could divulge information to Hotel Agents that it does not want in turn
divulged to sub-contractors.
3. User Agent cannot prevent a contractor from modifying any details of the contract
when it is passed on to a subcontractor.
Although the second and third conditions aren’t concerned in Seagent for now, the
first one is an important issue. The main security concerns for all of these are:
• Non-repudiation: User Agent or Hotel Agent can deny that an event such as a
message transmission or message delivery has occurred(line item 1).
• Lack of authority delegation: an agent such as a manager cannot control how second
parties protect confidential information on to third parties (line item 2-3).
4.6. Security Interaction Protocols
The communication security mechanisms have to be considered further where in
the FIPA architecture to be able to solve the security problem. So architectural issues and
interaction protocols have to be covered by comparing the existing structures ”(Borselius
and Mitchell 2003)” and Seagent security security structure.
As shown in Figure 4.7, one way is to let the agent receive the message as usual,
and when the agent has determined that it is an encrypted or signed message, it forwards
the message to the appropriate service to decrypt it or to verify the signature. The agent
would then be returned the decrypted message or an indication of the outcome of the
signature verification. Similarly when the agent wants to send an encrypted message or a
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signed message it would send the message to the appropriate service and be returned the
processed message, which now can be sent as usual.
Figure 4.7. Security services separated from ACC (Source: Borselius and Mitchell 2003)
A second option, depicted in Figure 4.8, would be to let the ACC intercept the
communication and other the security services in a more transparent way to the agent.
This would require the ACC to be able to determine if incoming communication is en-
crypted or signed, as well as getting an indication from the agent whether encryption or
signing should be done before sending the message.
Figure 4.8. Security services transparent to agents (Source: Borselius and Mitchell 2003)
In Seagent, the message is sent to Seagent security service layer and the proper
operations as encryption and digital signature are operated. Then the message with
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appropriate envelope properties are returned to the agent. If an agent firstly sends a mes-
sage to other agent, envelope includes ”fipa-security-publickey”, a specialized property by
Seagent, named SecurityObject. If the agents own each of the others public key, one of
them generate the shared key and sends to the other. In this situation, the message enve-
lope includes encrypted payload ”fipa-security-encryption” and ”fipa-security-signature”
SecurityObject. If all of these operations have been made, the request only includes Enve-
lope with ”fipa-security-signature” SecurityObject. This is basically the communication
of agent and security infrastructure for Seagent.
Figure 4.9. Secure communication for Seagent
4.7. Previous Work on Agent Communication Security
Through the way of working around agent security approaches, different strategies
have been constructed by using basic security concepts and their interactions between
agents and agent systems. With the extended security paradigms, the more secure multi-
agent systems have been tried to be developed. Some of them are told below.
One approach proposes a security based agent for building a safeguard for a multi-
agent system to protect its information, and to reasonably distribute tasks to cooperative
objects to solve the issue of concurrent events ”(Huang et al. 2004)”. The main objectives
for this kind of system approach are to overcome time and space constraints and to keep
the balance between agents’ workload. In this approach, workload is especially tried to
be balanced by resource management by counting the same task requests. If the number
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exceeds five, the system will add a record about the task information into the knowledge
base. The next time the same task request happens, the knowledge base management
module can directly search the result from the knowledge base. This approach fastens
the knowledge base after security requests and responses between user and member of the
MAS. These interactions for security employ strong identity authentication methodology,
which applies cryptographic technology and a digital certificate to a system with role
strategy, in order to overcome the problems of a login name/password and protect the
system resources.
Another approach outlines a design for a secure mobile agent architecture termed
MATRIX (Mobile Agent Technology Robust Infrastructure Exploration) ”(Ghanea-
Hercock and Gifford 2001)”. Static agents on each host communicate each other by using
mobile agents via XML formatted agent communication language. So a mobile agent au-
thentication strategy is developed for reaching static agents. Additionally the encryption
of messages between agent servers during communication, role-based origin authentica-
tion and encrypting collected data by agents are the main security concerns for MATRIX
approach. This approach has also an authorization solution used by agent servers that
the tasklists requested by the mobile agents are processed to prevent malicious agents can
access services or take information from the agent server’s services.
Another approach is especially a message-based approach. It uses Open PGP
message structure in order to be able to evaluate its appropriateness for FIPA messages
”(Borselius and Mitchell 2003)”. The Open PGP protocol defines standard formats for
encrypted messages, signatures, and certificates for exchanging public keys. PGP mes-
sages are constructed from a number of records referred to as packets. A packet is a
piece of data that has a tag specifying its meaning. A PGP message consists of a number
of packets. Some of those packets may themselves contain other packets. Each packet
consists of a packet header, followed by the packet body. If there are reasons for treat-
ing the elements within the ACL differently, for example to only encrypt or sign certain
elements, additional information would need to be provided to the agent to indicate how
the message should be processed. To make use of the Open PGP message structure for
FIPA agent communication, there has to be additional information to be added in the
message envelope. For full extensibility, the ACL message should also carry information
describing the security mechanisms applied to the message.
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”(Borselius and Mitchell 2003)” approach is similar to the Security Object ap-
proach of FIPA. Different tagged packet types for different goals as Public Key Packet or
Secret Key Packet substitutes the giving names of packets in the envelope’s ”type” field.
This kind of approach has been developed near the time of Security Object approach. So
this is a good comparative paradigm for the agent security developers.
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CHAPTER 5
SEAGENT SECURITY
Seagent security is based on end-to-end message encryption and digital signature
mechanisms. When it is developed, security concepts have been used that are told in the
previous chapter.
It should be noted that security usually comes at a cost. Additional computing
resources as well as communication resources are required by most solutions to achieve
the mentioned security requirements in the previous chapter. So the solutions for a secure
system should be optimized to provide the maximum performance for the system.
In Seagent, security mechanisms need to be able to at the purpose and nature
of the communications of various conditions with differing security requirements. So
while designing Seagent security, flexibility and modularity of the security subsystem is
especially considered.
5.1. Design Issues of Seagent Security
FIPA agents operate within the context of FIPA agencies (called FIPA agent plat-
forms) which provide typical generic support services, also called middleware services.
FIPA agencies manage their life-cycles, enable them to provide and access services and
supports communication with other agents in the same and in different agencies. Current
agent middleware services, except for the communication services, are provided by two
core FIPA middle agents (also called facilitator agents) called the Agent Management
System (AMS) and the Directory Facilitator (DF) respectively.
All service user agents and service provider agents must register themselves with
the AMS. This registration process allows the definition of a contract between any agent
and the AMS in order to enable the AMS to manage their life-cycles.
There is current debate within FIPA as to whether these middleware services ought
to continue to be accessed solely through service provider agents.This has been criticized
as being both inefficient, e.g., an agent must send a forward message to an ACC to get
it to send a message to the other agent residing in another agency, and perhaps too
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unmanageable to integrate or embed within a nonagent service infrastructure. Thus, in
the current agency model, the ACC still exists as a communication service but it is no
longer an agent, it is invoked via some internal API ”(Poslad and Calisti 2000)”.
According to the explained communication protocol, Seagent security addresses
the challenges especially insecure communication. Security model manages corrupted
messages by using a PKI handshaking protocol between the agents to verify validity
of both parties. All messages for user agents, service provider agents and middleware
services are encrypted according to Public Key Infrastructure(PKI). Although there is not
a certification mechanism to be able to validate their identities, dispatching mechanism is
able to cope with message security, only with digital signatures without a third party. All
agents are held accountable for their actions because they have to sign all service queries
and requests with their own private key. As there is a unique private key public key pair,
once an agent signs a request, the agent can be held accountable. These concepts are
explained in Section 5.3. with diagrams in detail.
Seagent security design is based on below Figure 5.1 primitively. The security con-
cerns are implemented as cross-cutting concerns for communication and planning layers.
The encrypted message is created in Planner(or Dispatcher) and sent to the other agent
via communication channel(ACC). While these operations are occurred,only the service
layer for the security scenario interacts with the agent or Planner. So the low-coupled
and highly-cohesive software infrastructure is preserved.
Figure 5.1. Seagent Security Model
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5.2. Security Modules for Seagent
Seagent security mechanism is basically used on the FIPA’s request-agree-inform
communicative acts. So the modules for Seagent is told according to this scenario in this
section.
To provide message security in Seagent, each agent has an AgentSecurityManager.
AgentSecurityManager provides the agents to hold their private/public key pair, session
keys used with the other agents, public keys of the agents that are communicated together
and the states of these public keys that the agent sends its public key to other agents or
receives public key from the other agent. These informations are used in secure communi-
cation between agents. SeagentSecurityService is the service layer of the Seagent security
structure. It is an encapsulation for encryption, signing, decryption, verifying and pub-
lic key operations. Agents and Dispatcher use the SeagentSecurityService to make the
appropriate operations to be able to provide a secure message.
As shown in Figure 5.2, firstly each agent generates their public/private key pair
to provide the secure conversation. In the beginning of the conversation between agents,
sender agent checks if it has sent its public key to other agent. If it has not sent before,
it adds the public key to the transport message with the help of SeagentSecurityService.
Then sender agent updates its public key map as it has sent the public key to the receiver
agent. Then sender agent sends its ACL message with public key to receiver through
Dispatcher. In this conversation, receiver agent makes the similar operations by using
the transport message. It updates its public key map and public key state map to re-
member that the receiving message from each of these agents to each other is encrypted
in the future conversation steps and the message structure is processed according to this
information.
As shown in Figure 5.3, for the second message between agents or agree message,
sender agent asks if it has the pair public key of the communicated agent and it sends
its public key to the receiver agent. If pairPublicKeySendState is not true, it sets the
pairPublicKeySendState to true for understanding sending public key to other agent.
However, SeagentSecurityManager determines the agent to add its public key to transport
message. Then the sender agent looks up if there is a shared key generated before. If there
is not, it generates and adds it to its AgentSecurityManager. Then sender agent encrypts
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the session key asymmetrically to be able share with the receiver agent. Lastly, the ACL
message is encrypted symmetrically and signed with this session key. The encrypted ACL
message, envelope with public key, encrypted session key and signature object is sent
to the pair agent. While the session key is encrypted with asymmetric encryption, the
ACL message uses symmetric encryption because of the slowness of the asymmetrical
encryption. Encrypting whole message with asymmetric encryption is a huge amount of
time. However, encrypting only the session key is a one time operation. The session key
is used along the conversation to be able to symmetrically encrypt the ACL message and
this improves the communication performance.
As shown in Figure 5.4, the receiver side takes this encrypted message and firstly
decrypts the session key with its private key obtained from its AgentSecurityManager.
Then it adds session key to its sharedKeyMap and updates sharedKeyStateMap according
to setting receiveState of the sender agent as true. Then the agent decrypts the ACL
message with this session key and decrypts the digital signature with the pair public
key to be able to own hash. Then it hashes the decrypted ACL message to compare two
hashes. If two of them are equal, it understands that this ACL message from the expected
sender and the message has not been tampered during conversation. So decryption and
verification steps are processed successfully.
As shown in Figure 5.5, sender agent sends the transport message through Dis-
patcher to receiver agent. Dispatcher generates the encrypted and signed message. Then
it obtains the session key of the conversation and the public key of the receiver agent
by using AgentSecurityManager of the sender. Then it sends the message to the receiver
agent. Receiver agent takes the message and processes the reverse of the above operations.
Using receiver agent’s own private key and session key from its AgentSecurityManager,
decryption and verification of the message is processed and the agent achieves to make
operations of the decrypted and verified ACL message.
After each of the agents have their public keys and session keys, they can easily
encrypt and sign messages. So in the third and the latter messages or the inform message
as told in the previous paragraph, messages are encrypted and signed properly. They are
sent with encrypted ACL message and the Signature SecurityObject in the Envelope and
the decryption process is made as told before.
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Figure 5.2. Sending public key in Seagent(Request)
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Figure 5.3. Sending public and session key with encrypting ACL message (Agree)
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Figure 5.4. Decryption of session key and message in Seagent
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Figure 5.5. Steps of conversation after sharing session and public keys
5.3. Security Design and Implementation for Seagent
Seagent security is basically called by SeagentSecurityService class that implements
an interface as shown in Figure 5.6. SeagentSecurityService is used as the communica-
tor of the agents, planner and Seagent security classes. The methods that are called by
Seagent security service is processed in SecurityFacade. SecurityFacade is used to sim-
plify access of SeagentSecurityService and SecurityMechanisms to decouple subsystems
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and provide the granularity of security issues. SecurityFacade can access AgentSecurity-
Manager to reach agent’s security properties as public key, private key or session key. By
taking these necessary security components, SecurityFacade execute like a bridge to en-
crypt and decrypt session key, encrypt and decrypt payload, sign message etc. This kind
of approach provides the SeagentSecurityService only what to execute, not how to execute.
Method infrastructure that will be processed by mechanisms are called by SecurityFacade
and the result is used by SeagentSecurityService.
Figure 5.6. Seagent security class diagram
AgentSecurityManager properties taken from SecurityFacade is used for parame-
ters passed to the Mechanisms(Confidentiality Mechanism, Key Agreement Mechanism
and Signature Mechanism). According to the sequence of scenario, the methods of these
classes are called and suitable operations are done for encryption, key agreement and
signature as shown in Figure 5.7. ConfidentialityMechanism is used for encryption and
decryption of payload and the key. KeyAgreementMechanism is used for controlling pair
public key of each of the agents. KeyAgreementMechanism controls that the agent has
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sent the public key, has received the pair public key or generated and shared the session
key. SignatureMechanism signs and verifies the payload of the transport message.
After asymmetrically encrypting session key, symmetrically encrypting payload
or generating signature, they have to be hold in the FIPA SecurityObject. Three dif-
ferent types for three different mechanisms as ”fipa-security-publickey”, ”fipa-security-
encryption” and ”fipa-security-signature” are generated with different parameters. Al-
though ”fipa-security-encryption” and ”fipa-security-signature” are the standard FIPA
reserved words, ”fipa-security-publickey” is not a reserved word. Because there is not a
known reserved word for public key agreement. According to design phase, instead of
creating different constructors for each of these three objects, Builder design pattern has
been used for different instances of SecurityObjects as shown in Figure 5.8. The main
purpose of this design approach is to simplify complex object creation by defining a class
whose purpose is to build instances of another class. So SecurityObjectManager is used to
create a SecurityObject according to the type of the mechanism with different parameters
of the SecurityObject.
Key generation is another important concern. For now, 3DES for symmetric key
generation and RSA for asymmetric key generation is used in Seagent as shown in 5.9.
However, the abstract SymmetricKeyGenerator and AsymmetricKeyGenerator classes are
able to be extended for different algorithms by using a factory class for choosing the algo-
rithm and this algorithm is agreed on the agents with the SecurityObject’s ”algorithm”
field.
Seagent security also encodes session keys with Base64. Encoding of the keys
in the SecurityObject is a FIPA specified SecurityObject property. Base64 encoding
scheme is used for keys as specified in the spec. Base64 encoding scheme encodes the
messages with 6 bit blocks and 26 = 64 different characters from a-z, A-Z and 0-9 for the
first 62 digits but the symbols chosen for the last two digits vary considerably between
different systems, especially for padding. By encoding key, receiver side decodes the
session key after decoding it and takes the usable session key. This transformation provides
encapsulation of session key between agents.
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Figure 5.7. Seagent mechanisms class diagram
Figure 5.8. Seagent SecurityObject generation
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Figure 5.9. Seagent Key Generation
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5.4. Experimental Results
In agent communication protocols for making a secure communication, the agents
have to realize some protocol requirements according to communicative acts. The agent
interaction is showed in Section 5.2. with detailed sequence diagrams.
In this implementation, the overheads for the communication is measured by test-
ing in one host with Windows XP and JDK1.5.
In experimental analysis, firstly the unencrypted message communication is mea-
sured. According to this measure, this measurement is compared with the encryption
scheme. But the encryption scheme has different steps. So each step time is individually
calculated and the values have been obtained according to cost analysis. The values are
shown in Table 5.1.
As shown in the Table 5.1, when the message content size increases, the commu-
nication time also increases. However, communication overhead is considerably limited in
comparison to the overhead in security preparation.
Unencrypted message with public key in the envelope scheme in the Table 5.1 is
only considered in the beginning of the conversation. Encrypted message with signature
and session key in the envelope scheme is considered after one agent generates session
key and wants to share it with the other agent. Especially the encrypted message with
signature in the envelope and message without encryption lines of the table have to be
compared because of the conversation’s mostly used communication issues. The nearly
3 times more time for secure communication cost can be an acceptable or unacceptable
result according to the goal of the system.
With the implementation of Seagent security with Java, the implementation mech-
anism scenarios are also tested and the results are shown in Table 5.2.
The table 5.2 shows that the key pair generation time slows down the system,
but only in the beginning of the agent process time. Then the encryption and decryption
process affects the system less than the key pair generation time.
Encryption and decryption processes are measured within the working time of the
system by the subtraction of the end and start times of the process. These times are
not equal for all messages. The experimental results are the average of the all message
encryption and decryption processes.
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These results can change with the communication traffic flow, host performance
and algorithm preferences. In these results, 3DES as the symmetric encryption algorithm
and RSA as the asymmetric encryption algorithm is used. The RSA implementation
is provided by Bouncy Castle Provider because of the deficiency of Java Cryprography
Extension(JCE). With the encryption algorithms’ choice, the encrypted message size can
also change and the experiments can give different results.
Table 5.1. Seagent communication experimental results(milliseconds).
Communication Experimental Results Time(ms)
Message without encryption 47
Encrypted message with signature in the envelope 133
Unencrypted message with public key in the envelope 281
Encrypted message with signature and session key in the envelope 359
Table 5.2. Seagent security experimental results(milliseconds).
Security Experimental Results Time(ms)
Key Pair Generation Time 12737
Session Key Generation Time 47
Encrypt and Sign Time 223
Decrypt and Verify Time 145
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Agents have many definitions and cover both software and artificial intelligence
(AI) agents, being either mobile or intelligent agents. In this thesis, it is focused only
on software agents and in particular the FIPA agents. The multi-agent system domain
covers software agents, for which FIPA is a part of that is further based on the intelligent
agent domain.
Demands by agents about security help giving agents a way to reason about their
security-related capabilities and to adjust their own composition accordingly. So this
demand causes developing agent based security solutions. Especially the interaction of
agents and users increases this requirement in timely manner.
There are still ongoing projects that target the development, standardization and
testing of the FIPA agent platform. There are several challenges related to these issues
and the fact that building and fielding a MAS-based agent system. There are few systems
available for use in the real world, which also contribute to the fact that little effort has
been devoted to security issues in agent systems. The traditionally approach towards se-
curity and agents is to use encryption and to focus the research on adapting cryptography
techniques into agent systems. Since FIPA agent systems platforms operate in an open
environment, such as the Internet, communication links, information sources, services and
agents can appear and disappear dynamically. This opens for attacks by unauthorised
parties, such as hackers or malicious agents being able to spy on other agents (eavesdrop-
ping), steal or damage information or the infrastructure of components (manipulation),
and preventing access for authorised parties (denial of service).
In this study, only the message security solutions for agents have been developed.
The security issues have been told by using FIPA specified concepts. It is shown how
conventional security protocols can be used to provide secure communication within an
agent-based system. Data integrity and data origin authentication can all be provided for
agent interactions.
Seagent security now only makes the message security using RSA, MD5 and 3DES
algorithms. These mechanisms could be extended and an authentication protocol can be
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added to the system. These features can be provided by an agent and interaction schemes
can be implemented.
Authorization of different agents could be made by agents role and competencies to
a certification authority. So that in a complex AMS and DF, there could be an authoriza-
tion solution. When a search operation is used to discover an agent by a particular entity,
the agent services can be used either to constrain the search to an agent which supports
Certificate Authority services. This facility, of course, requires that agents provide the
search parameters of interest when they register with the DF. The DF should not be used
to store sensitive information. For example, the DF can store certificates, but should not
store private keys as all information in the DF is made public.
In conclusion, the first release of the Seagent security solution includes the all
appropriate functionality for FIPA security concept. With the usage of system, the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the security system can be seen better. However, new
security modules can be added to the system.
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APPENDIX A
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
3DES: Abbreviation for Tripple DES. Strengthened but even slower version of
DESwith effectively its original key size trippled.
Action: A basic construct which represents some activity which an agent may
perform. A special class of actions is the communicative acts.
Agent: An agent is the fundamental actor in a domain. It combines one or more
service capabilities into a unified and integrated execution model which can include access
to external software, human users and communication facilities.
Agent Communication Language (ACL): A language with precisely defined
syntax, semantics and pragmatics that is the basis of communication between indepen-
dently designed and developed software agents.
Agent Communication Channel (ACC): The Agent Communication Chan-
nel(ACC) is used for information provided by the Agent Management System to route
messages between agents within the platform and to agents resident on other platforms.
Agent Management System (AMS): The Agent Management System is an
agent which manages the creation, deletion, suspension, resumption, authentication and
migration of agents on the agent platform and provides a ”white pages” directory service
for all agents resident on an agent platform. It stores the mapping between globally
unique agent names and local transport addresses used by the platform.
Agent Platform: An agent platform provides an infrastructure in which agents
can be deployed. An agent must be registered on a platform in order to interact with other
agents on that platform or indeed other platforms. An AP consists of three capability
sets ACC, AMS and default Directory Facilitator(DF).
Asymmetric Cipher: Encryption where the key to be used to decrypt the ci-
phertext is different from the encryption key. Both keys are correlated, but it is a ”hard”
problem to derive one from the other.
Attack: Exploiting of vulnerability.
Authentication: It is the process of ensuring, that in a communication proto-
col a presented identity is impersonated rightly by the presenting entity. Further, an
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authenticated communication includes ensuring integrity of the data exchanged.
Cipher: Class of functions for encrypting and decrypting. Ciphers deal with the
characters of a message, at the syntactical instead of the semantical level as does a code.
Ciphertext: The result of applying a cipher function to a plaintext, the encrypted
output.
Communicative Act: A special class of actions that correspond to the basic
building blocks of dialogue between agents. A communicative act has a well-defined,
declarative meaning independent of the content of any given act.
Confidentiality: The property that information is not made available or disclosed
to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.
Content: One part of a communicative act which represents the domain depen-
dent component of the communication. Note that ”the content of a message” does not
refer to ”everything within the message, including the delimiters”, as it does in some lan-
guages, but rather specifically to the domain specific component. In the ACL semantic
model, a content expression may be composed from propositions or actions.
Content Language: The content of a FIPA message refers to whatever the
communicative act applies to. If, in general terms, the communicative act is considered
as a sentence, the content is the grammatical object of the sentence.
Conversation: An ongoing sequence of communicative acts exchanged between
two (or more) agents relating to some ongoing topic of discourse. A conversation may
(perhaps implicitly) accumulate context that is used to determine the meaning of later
messages in the conversation.
Cryptanalysis: Trying to break the security of a message.
Cryptanalyst: Person working on the field of cryptanalysis.
Cryptographer: Person working on the field of cryptography.
Cryptography: The science of keeping messages secure.
Cryptologist: Person working on the field of cryptology.
Cryptology: The sum of cryptanalysis and cryptography.
Deciphering: Synonymous but less common word for decryption.
Decryption: The opposite of encryption.
DES: Abbreviation for Data Encryption Standard. A specific block cipher.
Directory Facilitator (DF): The Directory Facilitator is an agent that provides
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a ”yellow pages” directory service for the agents. It stores descriptions of the agents and
the services they offer.
Encryption: Hiding the contents of a communicated message, so that unautho-
rized parties, that dont have access to a certain secret, i.e. the key, are not able to
semantically understand the contents. The reverse operation of restoring the original
contents is called decryption.
FIPA: Abbreviation for Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents.
Hash: Cryptographic checksum of fixed length, that is easily calculated but where
it is a ”hard” problem to find either the original value or another value with the same
checksum.
Integrity: Property of a communication, ensuring that no one is able to modify
the communicated data without this change being noticed.
JCA: Abbreviation for Java Cryptography Architecture. Classes of Java related
to cryptography.
Key: Input data for encryption and decryption functions. In symmetric algo-
rithms the key has to be a pre-established shared secret between the communicating
partners. In an asymmetric protocol, the secret key is held by only one party, the public
key is, as the name suggests, public.
Man-in-the-Middle: An attacker, located between two communicating parties
in the data path of a network.
Message: An individual unit of communication between two or more agents. A
message corresponds to a communicative act, in the sense that a message encodes the
communicative act for reliable transmission between agents.
Message Transport Service (MTS): The message transport service is an ab-
stract service provided by the agent management platform to which the agent is currently
attached. The message transport service provides for the reliable and timely delivery
of messages to their destination agents, and also provides a mapping from agent logical
names to physical transport addresses.
Mobile Agent: An agent that is not reliant upon the agent platform where it
began executing and can subsequently transport itself between agent platforms.
Non-repudiation: The impossibility for the signer of a message to later deny,
that he signed the document.
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Ontology: An ontology is an explicit specification of the structure of a certain
domain (e.g. e-commerce, sport). For the practical goals of FIPA (that is enabling
development and deployment of inter-operable agent-based applications), this includes a
vocabulary (i.e. a list of logical constants and predicate symbols) for referring to the
subject area, and a set of logical statements expressing the constraints existing in the
domain and restricting the interpretation of the vocabulary. Ontologies therefore provide
a vocabulary for representing and communicating knowledge about some topic and a set
of relationships and properties that hold for the entities denoted by that vocabulary.
Plaintext: The message to be hidden by applying a cipher function to it. Also
the result of correctly applying a deciphering function to a ciphertext.
RSA Cipher: Abbreviation for Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cipher. Probably the
best known and analyzed asymmetric cipher , named after its inventors, based on the
”hard” problem of factoring large numbers. Widely in use, but incumbered by patent
issues until recently.
Signature: A hash over a document, performed with a secret key, that can be
verified with the corresponding public key.
Stream Cipher: Encryption function, that works on only one bit of data at a
time.
Symmetric Cipher: Encryption, where the key to be used to decrypt the ci-
phertext is the same as was used for encryption.
Threat: Circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or harm to the
computing system.
User Agent: An agent which interacts with a human user.
Vulnerability: A weakness in the security system that might be exploited to
cause loss or harm.
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